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 Abstract 
 
Within the current context of Information Societies, large amounts of information are daily 
exchanged and/or released. The sensitive nature of much of this information causes a serious 
privacy threat when documents are uncontrollably made available to untrusted third parties. In 
such cases, appropriate data protection measures should be undertaken by the responsible 
organization, especially under the umbrella of current legislations on data privacy. To do so, 
human experts are usually requested to redact or sanitize document contents. To relieve this 
burdensome task, this paper presents a privacy model for document redaction/sanitization, which 
offers several advantages over other models available in the literature. Based on the well-
established foundations of data semantics and the information theory, our model provides a 
framework to develop and implement automated and inherently semantic redaction/sanitization 
tools. Moreover, contrary to ad-hoc redaction methods, our proposal provides a priori privacy 
guarantees which can be intuitively defined according to current legislations on data privacy. 
Empirical tests performed within the context of several use cases illustrate the applicability of 
our model and its ability to mimic the reasoning of human sanitizers. 
 
Keywords: data privacy; document redaction; data sanitization; information theory; data 
semantics 
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Introduction 
 
Information Societies require governments, public administrations and enterprises to 
exchange and release large amounts of sensitive information for various reasons. For example, 
the  Freedom of Information Act (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013) forces the government to 
release confidential information. In some countries, healthcare organizations require to provide 
medical records to insurance companies in response to Worker’s Compensation and Motor 
Vehicle Accident claims (Gordon, 2013). Because of the confidential nature of much of that 
information, responsible organizations should take appropriate protection measures to guarantee 
the fundamental right to privacy of individuals, thus fulfilling current legislations (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000; Health Privacy Project, 2013; The European Parliament and 
the Council of the EU, 1995).   
To guarantee individuals’ privacy, that is, the ability to seclude the sensitive information 
of an individual from the others, data protection/sanitization obfuscates or removes sensitive 
information. Traditionally, data protection has been performed manually, in a process by which a 
group of experts rely on their knowledge to detect and obfuscate the entities that, under their 
opinion, may disclose sensitive information by means of semantic inferences (e.g., treatments or 
drugs that may reveal sensitive diseases, readings that may suggest political preferences, habits 
that can be related to religion or sexual orientations, etc.) (Gordon, 2013). Semantics are in fact 
crucial in data privacy because they define the way by which humans (sanitizers, data analysts 
and also potential attackers) understand and manage information. However, because of the 
enormous amount of information that is daily disclosed (e.g., the US Department of Energy’s 
OpenNet initiative (U.S. Department of Energy, 2012) requires to sanitize millions of documents 
yearly), there is a need for automatic methods and tools in order to avoid the bottleneck and cost 
of manual sanitization (Dorr, Phillips, Phansalkar, Sims, & Hurdle, 2006; Gordon, 2013). 
The computer science community, under the umbrella of the privacy-preserving data 
publishing research field (Fung, Wang, Chen, & Yu, 2010), has proposed a plethora of protection 
methods. Most of them rely on formal privacy models to attain a predefined notion of privacy 
(Drechsler, 2011). Privacy models have been very popular in recent years because, in 
comparison to ad-hoc approaches in which the level of protection is empirically evaluated a 
posteriori for a specific dataset (Hundepool et al., 2013), models offer a priori privacy 
guarantees. Moreover, widely accepted privacy models provide a de facto standard to develop 
specific privacy-preserving methods, which can be objectively compared and evaluated under 
homogenous conditions. Finally, the a priori guarantees offered by these models fit better with 
current legislations and privacy guidelines (Department for a Healthy New York, 2013; 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2000; Health Privacy Project, 2013; Legal 
Information Institute, 2013; Nicholson & Smith, 2007; Terry & Francis, 2007; The European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU, 1995), which also give a priori rules on what and how 
much sensitive information should be protected. For example, the HIPAA “Safe Harbor” rules 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2000) state that “all geographic subdivisions 
smaller than a state” should be removed from patient Electronic Healthcare Records, whereas US 
state and federal privacy legislations (Health Privacy Project, 2013) specify that any information 
about HIV status or substance abuse should be removed prior releasing records for secondary 
 use. More broadly, EU regulations forbid to process personal data that may reveal racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs and any data concerning health 
or sex life (The European Parliament and the Council of the EU, 1995). 
According to the type of data to release (e.g., relational databases, transactional data or 
unstructured documents), the research community has proposed different privacy models. As it 
will be discussed in the next section, researchers have put a lot of effort into developing privacy 
models for structured data. Unfortunately, privacy models aiming at protecting unstructured 
documents, which are the focus of this paper and the most usual way of information exchange 
between actors, are much scarcer. 
 
 
Related works  
 
Privacy protection is usually referred to in the literature as the minimization of the 
probability of identity and/or attribute disclosure. The former covers the protection of 
information that can re-identify an individual, and is usually referred to as anonymity, whereas 
the latter covers the protection of confidential data (while identities may be left in clear). Privacy 
models usually aim at balancing the trade-off between data privacy and data utility (Domingo-
Ferrer, 2008), which would range between a perfect protection in which data is removed or 
encrypted while its utility is completely destroyed, and a direct publication of unprotected data, 
thus providing maximum utility but with no privacy protection at all.  
The first theoretical privacy model was proposed in (Dalenius, 1977), which stated that 
the access of a potential attacker to the protected data of an individual should not increase the 
attacker’s knowledge of the confidential information of that individual. This is a very strong 
assumption and it has been demonstrated that it is not practically feasible (Drechsler, 2011) when 
background knowledge is available, which is the most usual scenario. 
Recent works have development more practical models. Within the area of structured 
databases (also known as microdata), in which released data consist in records detailing a set of 
attributes of individuals (e.g., census data), k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) is the most well-
known privacy model. It is based on the classification of record attributes as:  
i) Identifiers: these univocally identify an individual and are systematically removed prior 
releasing (e.g., ID cards, SS numbers). 
ii) Quasi-identifiers: attributes whose combination of values may unequivocally disclose 
identities (e.g., age+job+place of birth). They have to be sanitized prior releasing. 
iii) Confidential attributes (e.g., salaries): these are left in clear form to retain the analytical 
utility of the published data.  
As the model name suggests, k-anonymity focuses on ensuring anonymity, that is, the 
impossibility of re-identifying any individual from the published data, while leaving anonymous 
confidential data in clear. The privacy guarantee specifies that, for a data set to satisfy k-
anonymity, any record in the set must be indistinguishable with regard to the values of the quasi-
identifier attributes from, at least, k-1 other records in the same set (identifying attributes are 
assumed to be removed). Practical implementations of the k-anonymity model usually group 
records in sets of cardinality k and replace them by a prototypical tuple (Domingo-Ferrer, 2008; 
Martínez, Sánchez, & Valls, 2013). Although k-anonymity helps to minimize identity disclosure, 
it may not protect against confidential attribute disclosure. This is the case of a group of k-
anonymous records that share the same confidential value (e.g., patients being or not AIDS-
 positive): even though an attacker would not be able to identify a particular individual from the 
group of k records, he will learn the individual’s confidential attribute because all the records in 
the group share the same value. Several authors have proposed extensions of the k-anonymity 
model to partially fix that issue: l-diversity (Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Gehrke, & 
Venkitasubramaniam, 2007), which requires a minimum variance between confidential attribute 
values of each group of k records, and t-closeness (Li & Li, 2007), which requires that grouped 
confidential attribute values follow a similar distribution to that of the whole dataset.   
From a different point of view, the more recent ε-differential privacy model (Dwork, 
2006) seeks to limit the knowledge gain provided by the protected data with regard to any 
individual in the input data set. Thus, it focuses on avoiding the disclosure of confidential 
information, rather than on anonymity. It requires the protected data to be insensitive to 
modifications of one input record with a probability depending on ε. In this manner, an attacker 
would not be able to unequivocally disclose the information of a specific individual with a 
probability depending on ε. To achieve this guarantee, most practical works add noise to the data 
in a magnitude so that the protected output becomes insensitive (according to the ε parameter) to 
a modification of an input record. Since the amount of noise required to fulfill this guarantee for 
the whole dataset is usually very high (Soria-Comas, Domingo-Ferrer, Sánchez, & Martínez, 
2014), thus compromising the utility of the output, most works apply ε-differential privacy in an 
interactive setting. In this scenario, a trusted party holds the database and answers queries sent by 
users with sanitized responses. This introduces limitations on both the number and type of 
supported query responses.  
The previous models rely on the structure of data (i.e., records with univalued attributes) 
to define, achieve and evaluate privacy guarantees. Much less attention has been paid to the 
definition of models for less structured data sets (e.g., lists of transactions) and completely 
unstructured data (e.g., plain text documents).  
For transactional data (like query logs (Batet, Erola, Sánchez, & Castellà-Roca, 2013)), 
where individuals’ information is represented by lists of items with variable and usually large 
cardinality, we find the km-anonymity model (Terrovitis, Mamoulis, & Kalnis, 2008). It 
considers that any combination with any cardinality of items in the transaction list may disclose 
the individual; thus, any item(s) in the list may act as quasi-identifier(s). The km-anonymity 
model ensures that the dataset is k-anonymous in front of an adversary with background 
knowledge of up to m items of any transaction. Similarly to the basic k-anonymity model, km-
anonymity may fail when background knowledge allows inferring causalities between items 
(Anandan & Clifton, 2011).  
Plain text documents (e.g., e-mails, sales or company descriptions, medical visit 
outcomes, etc.) are even more challenging. Their lack of structure prevents from defining a 
priori sets of identifying/quasi-identifying attributes. Like for transactional data, any 
combination of textual entities may produce disclosure. Thus, the barrier between anonymity and 
confidentially is diluted because i) confidential pieces of text may also enable re-identification, 
and ii) the privacy needs related to the document exchange may differ from one scenario to 
another: anonymity (e.g., to preserve the identity of the company described in a document) or 
confidentiality (e.g., to hide the fact that an individual suffers from a sensitive condition). In 
order to preserve the privacy in textual documents, two tasks are usually performed: i) detection 
of textual terms that may cause disclosure of sensitive information, which is usually tackled 
manually and ii) removal or obfuscation of those entities. The community refers to the act of 
removing or blacking-out sensitive entities as redaction, whereas sanitization consists on their 
 obfuscation by replacing them with appropriate generalizations (e.g., AIDS->disease) (Bier, 
Chow, P. Golle, T. H. King, & Staddon, 2009). Obviously, the latter approach is more desirable, 
since it better preserves the utility of the protected output. Moreover, in document redaction, the 
existence of blacked-out parts in the released document can raise the awareness of the 
document’s sensitivity in front of potential attackers (Bier et al., 2009), whereas sanitization 
gives no clues on entities’ sensitivity. Unfortunately, document sanitization has received less 
attention than the more harmful redaction (Anandan et al., 2012). 
Regarding the protection of barely semantic identifying data in textual documents (e.g., 
ID numbers, addresses, ages, dates, etc.), there exist automatic methods that exploit their regular 
structure in order to detect them by means of rules, patterns or trained classifiers (Meystre, 
Friedlin, South, Shen, & Samore, 2010). As stated in current legislations like the HIPAA 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2000), there are scenarios in which these identifiers 
should be directly removed/redacted in order to preserve the anonymity, as done within the 
context of structured databases. After that, the remaining textual entities, which lack a regular 
structure and may act as quasi-identifiers or refer to confidential information (e.g., sensitive 
diseases or topics like religion, race or sexuality), should be considered in order to minimize the 
disclosure risk inherent to semantic inferences. This can be done by enforcing a privacy model.   
Privacy models focusing on plain text documents are scarce and non-widely adopted. 
Moreover, they have a limited scope since they only focus on the protection of sensitive terms, 
which are assumed to be detected/defined a priori. First, we find two models that adapt the 
notion of k-anonymity in structured databases: K-safety (Chakaravarthy, Gupta, Roy, & 
Mohania, 2008) and K-confusability (Cumby & Ghani, 2011). Both approaches assume the 
availability of a large enough and, ideally, homogenous collection of documents (e.g., contents 
of e-mails of employers from a company). They require each sensitive entity contained in each 
document of the collection to be indistinguishable from, at least, K-1 other entities present in the 
collection. For the K-safety model, this should be also fulfilled with regard to the contexts with 
which sensitive entities usually co-occur (e.g., names and birth places for persons). In both 
cases, the authors generalize terms or contexts, so that they become less diverse and, hence, 
indistinguishable enough. As drawbacks, documents cannot be sanitized individually, and, due to 
the need to generalize heterogeneous terms to a common abstraction, a high loss of utility will 
happen if document contents are not homogenous.  
Finally, in (Anandan et al., 2012) the authors present a more practical model named t-
plausibility, which allows to sanitize textual documents individually. The model relies on 
generalizing sensitive entities and states that a document holds t-plausibility if, at least, t 
documents can be derived from the protected document by specializing sanitized entities. In 
other words, the protected document generalizes, at least, t plausible documents obtained by 
combining specializations of sanitized terms. To do so, it is required a detailed knowledge base 
covering every possible sensitive entity, both to retrieve generalizations used to sanitize sensitive 
terms and to count the number of plausible versions that can be obtained by means of 
specializations. This limits the accuracy of the method according to the suitability of the 
knowledge base with respect to the contents of the document to be protected. The authors also 
note that, with the t-plausibility model, some entities could be generalized more than others, 
which would result in some entities being worse protected than others. To tackle this problem, 
the authors also propose a more practical model (uniform t-plausibility) that tends to ensure that 
all entities are generalized uniformly. In this case, they seek for an ad-hoc balance between an 
optimal t-plausibility and a sanitization in which they generalize all sensitive entities to the same 
 level of abstraction. As drawback for both models, it is noted that setting the t-plausibility level 
is not intuitive for end users and that one can hardly predict the results, because they depend on 
the document size, the number of sensitive entities and the amount of 
generalizations/specializations modeled in the knowledge base. Finally, these approaches 
evaluate and sanitize textual terms independently, neglecting the fact that, due to semantic 
inferences (Anandan & Clifton, 2011; D. Sánchez, Batet, & Viejo, 2013c), combinations of 
several terms (e.g., symptoms and medical procedures) may unequivocally disclose sensitive 
information (e.g., a disease). 
 
 
Contributions and plan  
 
In this paper we propose a new privacy model that tackles the limitations of available 
privacy models focusing on unstructured textual documents. Its goal is to mimic and, hence, 
automatize the reasoning of human sanitizers with regard to semantic inferences, disclosure 
analysis and protection of textual documents. To achieve that, our proposal relies on an 
assessment and quantification of the data semantics that human experts usually consider in 
document sanitization (Bier et al., 2009; Gordon, 2013). Our proposal provides the following 
contributions over the state of the art: 
 In comparison with available models (Anandan et al., 2012; Cumby & Ghani, 2011), 
which assume that all risky terms (sensitive entities or related terms) have been identified 
a priori, our proposal automatizes both the detection of terms that can disclose sensitive 
data via semantic inferences and their protection. This relieves human sanitizers from 
manually identifying related terms, which has been identified as one of the most difficult 
and time-consuming challenges (Bier et al., 2009; Gordon, 2013). To do so, our model 
considers, as human sanitizers do, the semantic relationships by which terms or 
combinations of terms appearing in a document would disclose sensitive information via 
semantic inferences. Moreover, our proposal automatizes both the redaction and 
sanitization of risky terms. Hence, it facilitates the design of automatic methods that 
cover the whole sanitization/redaction task. 
 Our approach offers a flexible and intuitive way of setting the privacy requirements in 
specific scenarios, by stating what is considered sensitive and up to which degree it 
should be hidden. Contrary to models like t-plausibility (Anandan et al., 2012), it offers a 
clear and a priori privacy guarantee on how sensitive entities will be protected, which 
does not depend on the document size or the number of sensitive entities. Moreover, the 
privacy criterion can be set using intuitive linguistic labels rather than abstract numbers. 
As a result, the model can be easily and straightforwardly instantiated according to 
current legislations and regulations on data privacy (Department for a Healthy New York, 
2013; Department of Health and Human Services, 2000; Health Privacy Project, 2013; 
Legal Information Institute, 2013; Terry & Francis, 2007; The European Parliament and 
the Council of the EU, 1995), whose rules are also expressed linguistically (e.g., disease 
names, locations, etc.). Finally, our model supports both anonymity and confidentiality, 
thus enabling its application in scenarios in which identities should be hidden 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2000) and in which confidential attributes 
should be protected (Health Privacy Project, 2013). 
  Contrary to privacy models derived from k-anonymity (Cumby & Ghani, 2011; 
Chakaravarthy et al., 2008), our proposal supports the sanitization of individual 
documents, which is very convenient when managing heterogeneous sets of documents or 
in environments in which input documents are produced sequentially (e.g., e-mails from 
an individual’s mail account). 
 Contrary to t-plausibility (Anandan et al., 2012), our model does not require a knowledge 
base to protect the input document, even though its availability will contribute to improve 
the utility of the sanitized output.  
 
The enforcement of our model builds on the foundations of the Information Theory to 
ensure that the offered privacy guarantees are coherent with how textual information is used and 
how their semantics are interpreted by humans (either sanitizers or potential attackers). 
Moreover, it is sustained by previous research (D. Sánchez, Batet, & Viejo, 2013a; D. Sánchez, 
Batet, et al., 2013c; D. Sánchez, Batet, & Viejo, 2014; David Sánchez, Batet, & Viejo, 2012), in 
which the suitability of its theoretical basis was empirically studied and evaluated.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents and formalizes 
our privacy model, detailing its privacy guarantees and the theoretical principles that enable its 
enforcement. The third section discusses some relevant aspects related to the model 
implementation and proposes a simple and scalable algorithm for document sanitization. The 
fourth section evaluates and discusses the empirical results obtained by the model 
implementation for several case studies. The final section depicts the conclusions and presents 
some lines of future research. 
 
 
A privacy model for document redaction/sanitization 
 
In general, information disclosure happens when an attacker is able to unequivocally 
discover some sensitive information (e.g., identities, confidential data) by analyzing the released 
data and exploiting his own knowledge. In order to ensure a robust privacy protection, this 
should be done in the worst-case scenario: attackers who know or have access to all the domain 
knowledge (Hundepool et al., 2013). 
More specifically, within the context of unstructured data protection, our goal is to mimic 
human judgments with regard to document sanitization, so that human experts can be relieved 
from such time-consuming task. As stated in the introduction, because human sanitizers analyze 
data from a semantic perspective and evaluate disclosure according to semantic inferences (Bier 
et al., 2009; Gordon, 2013), we interpret disclosure in terms of semantics of data. Informally, 
given the whole domain knowledge, this can be assessed by answering to this question: does a 
released term or a combination of terms in a document allow to unequivocally infer (via 
semantic inference) and, thus, disclose a sensitive entity?; by unequivocal we refer to the fact 
that there is no semantic ambiguity in the correct inference given the domain knowledge.  
Our privacy model, named c-sanitized, aims to avoid such unequivocal semantic 
inference/disclosure of sensitive entities in unstructured documents, while retaining some of their 
semantics in the protected document. In this manner, the utility of the protected document is 
partially preserved, which is mandatory for the purpose of information exchange/release. The 
basis of our model can be defined as follows. 
 
 Definition 1. c-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge K 
and a sensitive entity c to be protected, we say that D’ is the c-sanitized version of D if D’ does 
not contain any term t or group of terms T that individually or in aggregate can unequivocally 
disclose c by exploiting K. 
 
The sensitive entity c should correspond to the most general entity of the topic that must 
be protected prior releasing the document (e.g., a kind of disease such as cancer). Our model 
relies on the evaluation of the disclosure risk that terms present in D cause with regard to c given 
the domain knowledge K. In cases of disclosure, an enforcement of our model should take 
appropriate sanitization measures (e.g., removal/generalization) to those terms t or group of 
terms T that individually or in aggregate can unequivocally disclose c. For example if c refers to 
a sensitive disease (e.g., AIDS), t may refer to unequivocal agents (e.g., HIV) and T to groups of 
elements that, even though individually may seem innocuous, might be univocally associated to 
the disease when interpreted in aggregate (e.g., immune system + sexual transmission + 
influenza-like disease). From a practical perspective, our model instantiation can be performed in 
accordance with privacy legislations stating sensitive entities or topics in order to avoid 
disclosing, for example, HIV related data within a health record (Health Privacy Project, 2013); 
in this example, the document would be HIV-sanitized. 
From the perspective of the formal privacy notions commonly used in the literature, if c 
refers to confidential information (e.g., a sensitive condition such as HIV), the protection process 
will be implicitly focused on the protection of confidentiality/attribute disclosure. On the 
contrary, if c refers to identifying information (e.g., census data or geographical divisions such as 
Los Angeles), the protection process will be implicitly focused on protecting anonymity/identity 
disclosure. This provides a natural adaptation to different privacy needs and scenarios. If several 
topics should be sanitized (e.g., medical conditions, but also census-related data like state 
names), several instantiations of the model with different entities c can be iteratively applied 
over the same document (e.g., HIV-sanitized, Los Angeles-sanitized) so that each sanitization 
step is made in coherence with the topic defined by each c. In such cases, we generalize our 
model for lists of sensitive entities (e.g., {HIV-Los Angeles}-sanitized), as follows. 
 
Definition 2. C-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge K 
and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the C-sanitized version of D if 
D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T that that individually or in aggregate can 
unequivocally disclose any entity in C by exploiting K. 
 
The next section details how the model can be enforced by quantifying the entity 
disclosure caused by semantic inferences from an information theoretic perspective. 
 
 
An information theoretic enforcement 
 
The cornerstone of the proposed model is how to assess whether c or those entities in C 
are or are not unequivocally disclosed by the presence of a term or group of terms in D. As 
discussed above, this kind of inferences is enabled by the semantics inherent to the released data 
that the domain knowledge K enable (Chow, Golle, & Staddon, 2008). That is, if according to K, 
terms in D are closely semantically related to entities in C, the risk of disclosure will be high. 
 However, since semantics is an inherently human and qualitative feature, the detection of 
possible inferences and the quantification of the resulting disclosure are not trivial. To tackle this 
problem, we adopt an information theoretic quantification of data semantics and, thus, of 
disclosure risk. The basic idea is that the semantics encompassed by a term appearing in a 
context can be quantified by the amount of information it provides, that is, its Information 
Content (IC). 
The notion of IC has been extensively used in the past to quantify term semantics and to 
compare the resemblance between terms in the area of semantic similarity (Resnik, 1995; D. 
Sánchez, Batet, & Isern, 2011). More specifically, the IC of a textual term t and, thus, the 
semantics encompassed by t, can be computed as the inverse of its probability of occurrence in 
corpora (which represents the knowledge K). 
( ) log ( )IC t p t 
    (1) 
Ideally, if corpora are large and heterogeneous enough to reflect the information 
distribution at a social scale, resulting IC values will be a faithful representation of term’s 
semantics (Cilibrasi & Vitányi, 2006) as they are understood and used by humans in their 
communicative acts. In fact, these human actors can be either expert sanitizers, who exploit their 
knowledge to minimize disclosure risks, authorized readers of the sanitized document, for whom 
the document’s utility directly depends on the semantics encompassed by the terms appearing in 
it (Martínez et al., 2013), or potential attackers, who can exploit the revealed semantics and 
available knowledge to disclose sensitive data. Thus, a privacy model that considers the whole 
semantics of terms as they are understood by society will implement a realistic notion of the 
practical privacy risks and of data utility. In fact, empirical experiments conducted in (D. 
Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013a, 2013c; D. Sánchez et al., 2014) illustrated the direct relationship 
between the amount of semantics encompassed by textual terms (i.e., their informativeness) and 
their disclosure risk and sensitivity. 
Notice that by applying the notion of IC to the sensitive entity c, it turns that IC(c) is 
measuring the semantics of c and, thus, the amount of sensitive information that should be 
protected. Since the revelation of this amount of information in the output document is what 
unequivocally provides the semantics of c and, thus, discloses c, our model and the notion of 
unequivocal disclosure (Definition 2) can be enforced in terms of Information Theory as follows. 
 
Definition 3. C-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge K 
and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the C-sanitized version of D if, 
for all c in C, D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T that, according to K, reveal 
IC(c) information about c. 
 
As stated earlier, the disclosure risk or the degree of semantic revelation that terms 
appearing in a document produce with respect to a sensitive entity depends on the closeness of 
the semantic relationships between them (e.g., a sensitive disease and its unequivocal 
symptoms). In terms of information, the amount of c’s semantics, that is, IC(c), 
provided/revealed by terms t or groups of terms T appearing in the document, can be measured 
according to Mutual Information (MI) between two variables (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013c). 
The instantiation of MI for two specific outcomes, that is, the term/group of terms t/T and the 
sensitive entity c, corresponds to their Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI). PMI measures the 
amount of information overlap (see some examples in Figures 1-4) between two entities. PMI 
has been used in the past to measure the semantic similarity between pairs of terms (Bollegala, 
 Matsuo, & Ishizuka, 2009; D. Sánchez, Batet, Valls, & Gibert, 2010), that is, the amount of 
semantics that the two terms reciprocally provide of each other. PMI can be computed as the 
difference between the normalized probability co-occurrence of the two entities, given their join 
and marginal distributions in corpora (Church & Hanks, 1990): 
( ) log
( ) ( )
( , );PMI c
p c p t
p c tt      (2) 
Numerically, PMI is maximal if, according to K, t always co-occurs with c, resulting in 
PMI(c;t)=IC(c). This states that c is completely disclosed by t because the semantics of the 
former can be inferred from the latter, given their usage in society. Thus, our privacy model can 
be completely enforced in terms of information quantification, as follows. 
 
Definition 4. C-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge K 
and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the C-sanitized version of D if, 
for all c in C, D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T so that, according to K, 
PMI(c;t)=IC(c) or PMI(c;T)=IC(c), respectively. 
 
To fulfill Definition 4, those terms t in D whose PMI with regard to c is equal to the IC of 
c, should be sanitized/redacted from the output document D’. 
 
As discussed earlier, even though an individual term t may not disclose the semantics of 
c, a combination of several individually innocuous terms T (e.g., combinations of treatments and 
symptoms) may produce a larger disclosure when considered in aggregate, because the degree of 
semantic revelation in such cases is the union of the individual revelations caused by each 
element of the group. To evaluate groups of terms T, where T={t1,…,tn} without ordering, PMI 
can be formulated as follows: 
( ) log
( ) ( )
( , ,..., );
,...,
1 n
1 n
PMI c
p c p
p c t tT
t t
    (3) 
In this manner, combinations of terms that fully reveal the semantics of c (that is, that 
always co-occur with c) can be also detected, even though each term of the group may not 
individually disclose c.  
 
 
Characterizing the semantics of disclosure 
 
To better understand the semantics that term (co-)occurrences and IC/PMI scores 
quantify, and how these enable disclosure, in this section we characterize different types of 
information disclosure according to the type of semantic relationship between the sensitive entity 
c and a term t occurring in the document to protect: 
 t and c are taxonomically related. Several cases can be distinguished: 
o The term t is a generalization of c (e.g., c=AIDS, t=immune system disease or 
c=Hepatitis C, t=Hepatitis): since the semantics of t are completely encompassed 
by its specialization c, which inherits the semantic features of its taxonomic 
ancestors, it can be concluded that t provides a strict subset of the information of 
c. This is coherent because, if both the specialization and the generalization 
appear in the same context, the latter provides no additional information about the 
 former. The graphical representation of the corresponding disclosure in terms of 
informativeness is shown in Figure 1. Thus, according to the privacy model, it is 
not necessary to sanitize/redact t. In terms of probability, term generalization 
occurrences must be counted whenever any of the specializations occur (Resnik, 
1995). This results in monotonically increasing probabilities as terms become 
more general, that is, p(t)>p(c) and, thus, IC(t)<IC(c). Moreover, thanks to the 
coherent counting, we have that p(c,t)=p(c) and, thus, we obtain 
PMI(c;t)=log(p(c,t)/p(t)p(c))=log((p(c)/p(t)p(c))= log(1/p(t))=-log(p(t))=IC(t), 
which corresponds to the greyed area of Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Information disclosed (greyed area) of c when t is a generalization of c. 
 
o The term t is a specialization or a synonym/lexicalization of c (e.g., c=Hepatitis, 
t=Hepatitis C or c=immune system disease, t=AIDS, or c=HIV, t=Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus or c=AIDS, t=Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome): in 
case of specialization (the first two examples), that is, the semantics of c are 
encompassed by t, t’s informativeness is a strict superset of the information 
provided by c. In case of being synonyms (the last two examples), that is, both 
sharing the same semantics, the informativeness of c and t are also the same. The 
disclosure corresponding to these cases is illustrated in Figure 2. Given the 
previous probability calculus, we have that PMI(c;t)=IC(c) because p(c,t)=p(t) 
and p(c)≥p(t). Since t completely discloses c (and even adds more information in 
case of being a specialization), according to Definition 4, t must be 
redacted/sanitized. Notice that, if a document has been c-sanitized, it will be also 
c’-sanitized for all c’ that are a taxonomic specialization of c. For example, the 
sanitized output will be identical if the document has been Hepatitis-sanitized or 
{Hepatitis, Hepatitis C}-sanitized, given that Hepatitis C is a specialization of 
Hepatitis. Thus, to avoid redundant calculus, c should correspond to the most 
general entity of each topic that should be protected.  
  
 
Figure 2. On the left: information disclosed of c (greyed area) when t is a taxonomical 
specialization of c. On the right: information disclosed from c (greyed area) when t is a synonym 
of c. 
 
 t and c are non-taxonomically related (e.g., c=AIDS, t=contaminated blood transfusion or 
c=Hepatitis C, t=liver failure). A non-taxonomic semantic relationship implies that c and 
t share a portion of their semantics, even though they are not strictly encompassed by 
each other like in the case of taxonomic relationships. Hence, as shown in Figure 3, t 
provides a subset of the information of c, whose size is a function of the closeness of the 
semantic relationship. Thus, PMI(c;t)≤IC(c) because p(c,t)≤p(c).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Information disclosed of c (greyed area) when t is non-taxonomically related to c. 
 
 Moreover, the co-occurrence of several non-identical terms within the same context 
(constituting the group of terms T) may increase the disclosure of the semantics of c. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, this is because each ti in T provides a potentially 
overlapping but non-identical subset of the semantics of c, according to the kind of taxonomic or 
non-taxonomic relationship that links them (e.g., c=AIDS, t1=immune system disease, 
t2=contaminated blood transfusion, or c=Hepatitis C, t1=Hepatitis, t2= liver failure). Hence, the 
evaluation of disclosure should consider the union of the information of c provided by all terms 
in T, as it is shown in Figure 4. This corresponds to PMI(c;T). According to the size of this 
union, we obtain PMI(c;T)≤IC(c) because p(c,t1,…,tn)≤p(c). 
 
Figure 4. Information disclosed of c (greyed area) by the co-occurrence of t1 (which is a 
generalization of c) and t2 (which is non-taxonomically related to c). 
 
 
Preventing disclosure 
 
According to Definition 4, to avoid disclosing c, those t or T whose PMI with regard to c 
equals IC(c) must be masked prior releasing the document. It is quite common in practice to 
simply remove/black-out risky terms (i.e., document redaction) (Chow et al., 2008; D. Sánchez, 
Batet, et al., 2013c), so that the disclosed information/semantics are annulled. However, this act 
severely hampers the utility of the output, which closely depends on the preservation of data 
semantics (Martínez et al., 2013). Moreover, it also raises awareness of the sensitive nature of 
the document, because of the presence of removed/blacked-out parts (Bier et al., 2009). 
Since our privacy model enables retaining a certain degree of semantics/utility without 
completely disclosing entities in C, risky terms t (e.g., AIDS) are alternatively replaced by an 
appropriate generalization g(t) (e.g., disease) in a process referred to as document sanitization 
(Bier et al., 2009). As it is shown in Figure 5, because g(t) encompasses the semantics of t and 
thus provides a strict subset of the information of t, it also lowers the amount of disclosure of c. 
This allows fulfilling the privacy criterion of Definition 4 while retaining a certain amount of 
semantics/utility, which can be quantified as IC(g(t)). 
 
  
Figure 5. Information retained/disclosed (darker greyed area) when sanitizing (i.e., generalizing) 
the term t. 
 
That is, by replacing terms that may cause disclosure of a sensitive entity by appropriate 
generalizations, we are rendering them equivocal enough (from the perspective of semantic 
inferences) so that potential attackers will not be able unequivocally discover the entity, which is 
our goal. 
Given a risky term t, the optimal generalization g(t) from the perspective of utility 
preservation should retain the maximum amount of semantics (i.e., IC(g(t))) while fulfilling the 
privacy model (i.e., PMI(c;g(t))<IC(c)). For individual terms t, the selection of the optimal 
generalization is straightforward. However, when considering groups of terms T of any 
cardinality from D, the optimal sanitization (i.e., the combination of generalizations of each ti in 
T that retains the maximum amount of semantics while fulfilling the privacy model for any group 
of terms in D) is NP-hard. This is also inherent to most privacy models (Anandan et al., 2012; 
Cumby & Ghani, 2011; Chakaravarthy et al., 2008) because the order in which terms in D are 
evaluated influences the order in which the groups of terms T are evaluated and sanitized. Hence, 
an optimal sanitization would require evaluating all possible combinations of terms in D of any 
cardinality and any possible generalization of each ti in T, and picking up the combination of 
elements that optimizes the result. To render this process practical, different heuristics can be 
considered according to the priorities of the sanitization process (i.e., data utility, efficiency or 
disclosure risk). Some discussions on this are presented the next section. 
 
 
A parametric definition  
 
With the proposed model, a C-sanitized document will offer the guarantee of non-
unequivocal disclosure (i.e., no unambiguous inference) of any entity in C given the knowledge 
K. However, this guarantee could be too rigid and may still cause privacy risks because it is quite 
common to also consider the disclosure of a significant amount (but not necessarily all) of the 
semantics of the sensitive entities as a privacy breach (D. Sánchez, Batet, & Viejo, 2013b). 
 In order to provide a more flexible solution with regard to different (stricter) privacy 
needs, we introduce a parameter that lowers the amount of disclosed information bellow the 
maximum that enables the unequivocal disclosure. This proportionally increases the ambiguity in 
the attackers’ inferences because, according to the knowledge K, the less specific disclosed 
information will enable several plausible inferences. Thus, the increased ambiguity produces a 
lower likelihood that an attacker’s belief regarding the sensitive entity is true, because there exist 
other plausible solutions and there is no way to distinguish them. To do so, we extend Definition 
2 as follows: 
 
Definition 5. (α,C)-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge 
K and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the (α,C)-sanitized version of 
D if D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T that reveal 1/α or more of the semantics 
of any entity in C by exploiting K. 
 
In terms of Information Theory, Definition 4 can be extended likewise: 
 
Definition 6. (α,C)-sanitized: given an input document D, the whole domain knowledge 
K and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the (α,C)-sanitized version of 
D if, for all c in C, D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T so that, according to K, 
PMI(c;t)≥IC(c)/α or PMI(c;T)≥IC(c)/α, respectively. 
 
The α parameter is a continuous numerical value in the range [1..∞[. Setting α=1, we 
obtain the initial privacy model (Definitions 2 and 4). Setting α>1, the redaction/sanitation 
process will become stricter, since a smaller amount of disclosure will be allowed. For example, 
for α=2, less than half of the information content (roughly semantics) of any sensitive entity c is 
allowed to be disclosed. In practice, this adds a proportional degree of uncertainty to the 
attackers’ inferences that lowers the risk of unequivocal disclosure. In any case, how much the 
information to be released should be lowered to maintain the disclosure risk low enough is a 
matter of the specific scenario and privacy needs. This issue will be considered in the evaluation 
section. 
 
 
Model implementation 
 
This section discusses the main aspects that should be considered when developing 
redacting/sanitization methods and tools based on the proposed model, and gives some insights 
on how to tackle them. Finally, it proposes a simple algorithm that provides a scalable 
implementation of the model. 
 
 
Probability calculus 
 
The information theoretic enforcement of our model extensively relies on the assessment 
of the informativeness of terms that, in turn, is a function of their probabilities of occurrence/co-
occurrence. Thus, the exactness of the probability calculus is crucial to ensure that the model is 
evaluating a realistic representation of term semantics according to the domain knowledge K.  
 To compute term(s) probabilities for IC/PMI calculus, different resources can be used, 
which will represent the domain knowledge K considered in the analysis. In the past, many 
authors relied on tagged corpora, which produced accurate probabilities (Resnik, 1995) because 
terms have been manually associated to their conceptual abstractions and, thus, occurrences are 
properly disambiguated. Particularly, by following the probability calculus proposed in (Resnik, 
1995), in which occurrences of term specializations are also counted as occurrences of their 
generalizations, it is ensured that probabilities monotonically increase as terms are generalized. 
However, since corpora are usually tagged manually, the availability of large and representative 
enough tagged corpora, so that probabilities reflect the information distribution at a social scale 
(i.e., a realistic representation of social knowledge), is very unlikely. In consequence, even 
though some tagged corpora (such as the Brown corpus (Francis & Kucera, 1979)) are available, 
their limited size and scope result in data sparseness, especially for domain-specific terms (e.g., 
chemical compounds), named-entities (e.g., organization names) or newly minted terms (e.g., a 
new electronic device) (D. Sánchez et al., 2010). These terms are precisely the usual target of 
document sanitization due to their high informativeness (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013a).  
To tackle these limitations, it is possible to use large raw corpora instead. Contrary to 
tagged corpora, plain text resources are very common and easily accessible. The paradigmatic 
example is the Web, in which billions of electronic up-to-date textual documents are available. 
The use of the Web as corpora for probability calculus provides several advantages: i) its size, 
heterogeneity and social publication paradigm configure a realistic representation of the 
information distribution at a social scale (Cilibrasi & Vitányi, 2006), ii) Web Search Engines can 
be used as proxies for probability calculus by querying terms and by evaluating the resulting 
page count (D. Sánchez, Castellà-Roca, & Viejo, 2013; Turney, 2001), iii) from the perspective 
of document sanitization, some authors have considered the Web as a reasonable proxy of social 
knowledge, thus providing a good approximation of the whole knowledge K that attackers may 
exploit to disclose sensitive data (Staddon, Golle, & Zimmy, 2007). However, probabilities 
computed from plain text (i.e., by counting the number of explicit occurrences of words) are 
negatively affected by language ambiguity. This may underestimate the informativeness of a 
concept (i.e., in case of polysemic words appearing in different contexts with different senses) or 
overestimate it (i.e., because of synonymy or ellipsis, a number of appearances may not be 
considered). 
One can see that none of the previous approaches is free of flaws. Thus, probability 
calculus will be usually imperfect, either because of the data sparseness caused by the limited 
scope of the exploited data source or because of the language ambiguity inherent to plain text 
corpora. On the one hand, it is a matter of the concrete use case and sanitization needs to prefer 
one approach to another. On the other hand, the use of the more flexible (α,C)-sanitized model 
with α>1, which will result in a stricter sanitization, may help to mitigate the imperfections in the 
disclosure risk assessment caused by i) the underestimation of the probability of c, which will 
result in an overestimated informativeness of the sensitive entity and, thus, in a less strict 
sanitization, and ii) the overestimation of the probability of co-occurrence of c and t, which will 
result in an underestimation of the amount disclosed information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Scalability 
 
As argued earlier, the optimal sanitization with regards to data utility is NP-hard for the 
proposed model. This is common to privacy models that try to balance the trade-off between 
privacy and data utility (Anandan et al., 2012; Cumby & Ghani, 2011). To ensure the practical 
feasibility and scalability of the C-sanitized model in a real scenario, some aspects can be 
considered during its implementation. 
First, divide the input document in several contexts. In general, the closeness of the 
semantic relationship between terms co-occurring in a document tends to decrease as they are 
more distant in the text (Lemaire & Denhière, 2006). Hence, it is more likely to discover risky 
groups of terms within, for example, the same sentence than when terms are located in different 
paragraphs. By defining textual contexts and analyzing them independently, the number of term 
combinations to evaluate will significantly decrease. The context length will depend on the 
tightness of the discourse and also on the privacy needs. Usual textual contexts implemented by 
existing redacting/sanitization methods cover paragraphs, sentences (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 
2013b, 2013c) or adjacent words (Anandan & Clifton, 2011), even though the whole document 
can also be considered in case of very tight discourses (e.g., a patient medical record) (D. 
Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013c). 
Second, the evaluation of all groups of terms of any length is computationally costly. To 
mitigate this, it will be preferable to start analyzing individual terms and, then, iteratively add 
more elements to the group. In this manner, individual terms or smaller groups found to be risky 
and, thus, sanitized/redacted, would not be evaluated again (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013c). 
This will also limit the number of terms that can be combined together and, hence, the number of 
distinct groups to evaluate. 
Finally, an alternative to the evaluation of groups of terms with unbounded cardinality is 
to define a stricter privacy criterion by using the (α,C)-sanitized model and setting α>1. The 
bigger the α value is, the more likely will individual terms be found to be risky, thus reducing the 
need to evaluate groups of terms. Even though the omission of groups of terms (or limiting their 
cardinality) will likely produce less accurate results, it will also enable a highly scalable 
sanitization, in which the algorithm can solve the problem in linear time with regard to the 
number of terms in the document. 
 
 
Exploiting knowledge bases 
 
In order to implement a utility-preserving sanitization of sensitive terms (instead of 
simply removing them), a knowledge base (KB) organized in a taxonomic way is needed to 
retrieve the term generalizations (e.g., AIDS->immunodeficiency->disease) that will be used as 
replacements. A suitable KB for document sanitization should ideally provide a high recall, so 
that all or, at least, most of the potentially sensitive terms found in the input document are 
covered in the KB. Those sensitive terms that cannot be found in the KB would be removed, 
with the subsequent utility loss. Moreover, a fine grained taxonomic structure will be also 
interesting, so that the information loss derived from each generalization step can be minimized. 
By having fine grained generalizations available for each term, its sanitization can better 
approximate the optimal situation, that is, the term generalization that, while maximizing the 
amount of given information, fulfills the privacy guarantee of our model. 
 A general-purpose ontology such as WordNet, which covers thousands of general 
concepts and has been translated to many languages, is well suited as a generic solution. In fact, 
it has already been used by several sanitization methods (Anandan et al., 2012; Cumby & Ghani, 
2011). However, WordNet offers a limited coverage of named entities or recently minted terms. 
In this case, other more dynamic knowledge sources like ODP (the largest human-edited 
directory service, with more than 1 million categories) or YAGO (a knowledge base created 
from the structure of categories and articles of Wikipedia) may be more appropriate. 
For concrete sanitization scenarios (e.g., a healthcare organization needs to protect a 
patient record before providing it to an insurance company), domain specific KBs may be 
preferable. For example, in the medical domain, large and detailed biomedical KBs like 
SNOMED-CT, which models diseases, substances or medical procedures, are available. The use 
of these KBs instead of general-purpose ones in such domain-specific scenarios will likely 
improve the accuracy and utility of the sanitized output. 
Note that, in any case, the lack of a suitable knowledge base will not negatively affect the 
privacy protection of the output, but just the level of utility preservation, because, in the worst, 
case, sensitive terms will be redacted (removed) if no appropriate generalizations are available. 
 
 
A simple and scalable algorithm 
 
In this section we present a simple and scalable algorithm for document sanitization 
based on the information theoretic enforcement of our privacy model. This algorithm may serve 
as the basis to develop more accurate and elaborated solutions which carefully consider some of 
the issues discussed earlier in specific scenarios. 
 
Algorithm 1.  
Input:  D  //the input document  
        KBs  //the knowledge bases 
   C  //the entities to protect 
   α  //the parameter of the model 
Output: D’   //sanitized document 
  
1   D’=D; 
2   for each (ti ϵ D) do  
3     risky_term=false; 
4     ck=next(C); 
5     while (no(risky_term) and ck	്	null) do  
6       if (PMI(ck;ti)≥(IC(ck)/α)) then //According to Definition 6 
7         risky_term=true; 
8       else 
9         ck=next(C); 
10      end if 
11    end while 
12    if (risky_term) then 
13      Hi=getGeneralizations(ti, KBs); //Ordered generalizat. from KBs  
14      g_ti=next(Hi); 
  //Look for a generalization that fulfills Def. 6 for all cj in C 
15      while (not (PMI(cj;g_ti)<(IC(cj/α)  cj ϵ C)) do  
16        g_ti=next(Hi); 
17      end while 
18      sanitize(ti, g_ti, D’); //Replace occ. of ti in D’ by g_ti 
19    end if   
20  end for   
21  return D’; 
 
 To ensure the scalability of the model implementation, the algorithm considers individual 
terms t rather than groups of terms of any cardinality. It starts by obtaining each of the different ti 
terms found in the input document D (line 2). Then, it evaluates (lines 3-11) if each ti produces a 
higher than desired disclosure of any entity ck in C, according to the instantiation of our (α,C)-
sanitized model (Definition 6). If such is the case, ti is sanitized by replacing it with an 
appropriate generalization g(ti). To do so, an ordered list of generalizations (starting from the 
most specific one) is retrieved from the available knowledge bases (KBs) (line 13). Then, these 
generalizations are iteratively evaluated in order to discover the first one (i.e., the most specific 
and, thus, the most utility-preserving one) that fulfills the privacy criterion (Definition 6) for all 
the entities C to be protected (lines 14-17). We assume that there will always be a generalization 
that fulfills the privacy criterion even though it may correspond to the root concept of the KBs 
(e.g., entity in WordNet, world in ODP, etc.). Finally, all the occurrences of ti in the document 
are replaced by the suitable generalization g(ti) (line 18). When all the ti are evaluated, the 
resulting document D’ will be (α,C)-sanitized. 
Given that the cardinality of the entities to protect in C is fixed and usually small, and 
that the number of possible generalizations is also limited and small (e.g., a maximum of 15 for a 
large KB like WordNet), the algorithm solves the problem in linear-time with respect to the 
number of distinct terms ti contained the input document D. 
 
 
Experiments 
 
This section presents the evaluation of a set of empirical results obtained by the 
implementation of the proposed model within the context of several real use cases in data 
privacy. 
 
 
Application examples and evaluation data 
 
To show the applicability of our model to the privacy requirements stated by current 
legislations on data privacy, we instantiated it according to the following scenarios: 
 US states often dictate legislations on the privacy of medical data (Department for a 
Healthy New York, 2013; Health Privacy Project, 2013). These legislations mandate 
hospitals and healthcare organizations to redact some medical-related concepts that are 
considered of confidential nature before releasing patient records to, for example, 
insurance companies, in response to Worker’s Compensation or Motor Vehicle Accident 
claims, or a judge, in case of malpractice litigation (Bier et al., 2009). All references to 
substance abuse, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) or HIV status should be usually 
redacted/sanitized. This redaction process, which is usually tackled manually, consumes a 
large amount of time and human resources, and requires of maintaining lists of terms 
semantically related to the confidential entities, such as medications, treatments or 
symptoms (Bier et al., 2009).    
 US federal courts are required to redact personally identifying information about 
individuals from electronic or paper documents (Legal Information Institute, 2013). The 
same is also stated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
who defines a set of elements that has to be removed from electronic healthcare records 
 before hospitals can release them for secondary use (such as medical research). The 
objective is to avoid the unequivocal re-identification of identities (i.e., to preserve 
anonymity).  Many of these elements, due to their non-semantic nature and regular 
structure (e.g., social security numbers, birth years, zip codes, e-mail addresses, telephone 
numbers etc.), can be detected by means of specifically-tailored extraction patterns and/or 
trained classifiers (Meystre et al., 2010), as stated above. However, there are some 
elements (e.g., geographical subdivisions such as counties or cities), which should be 
redacted from a semantic perspective, and for which the presence of semantically related 
terms within the document may negate its redaction. 
 Data protection acts of European countries (The European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU, 1995) state that the information related to religion, ideology, sexual orientation or 
race is of sensitive nature and that companies and public organizations should protect 
them to avoid possible discrimination. This kind of data is specially unstructured, 
unbounded and inherently semantic, making it thus difficult to tackle by redaction 
systems based on trained classifiers. 
In all these cases, the C-sanitized model is especially suitable, both because of the 
unstructured and linguistic nature of the entities to protect and also because of the need to 
sanitize/redact semantically-related terms. 
To evaluate the implementation of our model we used, as input data, Wikipedia articles 
describing a set of entities considered as sensitive in the discussed use cases. As done by other 
related works (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013a; D. Sánchez et al., 2014; Staddon et al., 2007), 
Wikipedia articles were chosen due to being authoritative sources of information and also 
because of their high informativeness and semantically tight discourses, which configures a 
challenging redacting/sanitization scenario. 
First, we used the Wikipedia articles corresponding to HIV and STD, which are medical 
conditions usually considered confidential by US states and federal laws. The instantiation of our 
model for each document was HIV-sanitized, STD-sanitized, respectively. 
Then, we picked up geographical subdivisions corresponding to some US states with 
specific privacy rules on medical data (e.g., the Medical Information Reporting for California 
Hospitals (State of California Office of Satewide Health Planning & Development, 2013) or the 
New York State Confidentiality Law (Department for a Healthy New York, 2013)). Within the 
California state, we picked up the Los Angeles county Wikipedia article, in addition to the 
description of New York city. Thus, the instantiations of the proposed model were Los Angeles-
sanitized and New York-sanitized, respectively. 
Finally, as potentially discriminatory personal information, we used the Wikipedia 
articles corresponding to Homosexuality and Catholicism, for which the model instantiation were 
Homosexuality-sanitized and Catholicism-sanitized, respectively. 
 
 
Implementation 
 
The implementation of our model was based on the algorithm presented earlier. The 
following aspects related to the implementation and the experiments are worth noting: 
 To provide a general-purpose tool, probabilities required for IC/PMI calculi were 
computed from the hit count provided by a Web Search Engine (Bing, in particular) when 
 querying the evaluated terms (D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013a). Thus, we are using the 
whole Web as an approximation of the domain knowledge K available to attackers.  
 To mitigate the imprecisions that the Web-based probability calculus may introduce, the 
fact that groups of terms have not been considered in the implementation, and also to 
evaluate the influence of the model parameters, the (α,C)-sanitized model (Definition 6) 
was considered, with α values between 1.0, which corresponds to the original formulation 
of Definition 4, and 2.0, which results in a twice stricter sanitization, in terms of 
informativeness. 
 SNOMED-CT, WordNet and ODP, with this priority order, were used as KBs to retrieve 
generalizations. 
 Both redaction and sanitization were implemented in order to compare the utility gains of 
the latter approach when KBs are available. In the former case, lines 12-19 from 
Algorithm 1 were replaced by a simple removal of the terms found to be risky. In the 
latter case, the whole Algorithm 1 was applied. 
 
 
Evaluation criteria 
 
Because the main goal of our work is to be able to mimic human judgments regarding 
document sanitization, the evaluation has been carried out from the perspective of a human 
sanitizer. In this manner, we aim to evaluate whether the design of the model (unequivocal or 
partial disclosure of entity semantics), its information theoretic enforcement (IC as a 
quantification of semantics) and the specific implementation (term probabilities computed from 
the Web) are suitable enough to replace human sanitizers or, at least, assist them. Even though 
the use of a human expert focuses the evaluation on personal beliefs, at the same time, it is a 
realistic representation of our final goal and a good baseline, since potential attackers would 
hardly do better than expert sanitizers. 
First, in order to evaluate the accuracy of the detection process, a human expert was 
requested to manually redact each of the input documents with the aim to remove terms or 
groups of terms that, individually or in aggregate, may help to disclose the sensitive entity c 
when publishing the documents (i.e., HIV, STD, Los Angeles, New York, Homosexuality and 
Catholicism). Hereinafter, we refer to the set of terms identified as sensitive by the human expert 
as Η, whereas the set of terms detected by the implementation of our model is referred to as S. 
By comparing Η and S sets, we can evaluate the redaction performed by our model’s 
implementation in terms of precision, recall and F-measure.  
Precision (eq. 4) measures the percentage of terms automatically detected as sensitive 
(S), which have been also identified by the human expert (Η). The higher the precision is, the 
better the utility of the output because the number of non-necessary redacted terms is lower. 
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(4)
 
Recall (eq. 5) measures the percentage of correctly detected terms from the total number 
of terms detected by the human expert. The higher the recall is, the higher the privacy of the 
output will be. Recall usually plays a more important role than precision in document redaction, 
because a low recall may imply disclosing some data that may negate the redaction process 
(Anandan & Clifton, 2011). 
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(5) 
F-measure (eq. 6) measures the harmonic mean of precision and recall, thus, 
summarizing the accuracy of the automated redaction process. 
F measure
2× Recall× Precision
Recall + Precision
 
   
(6) 
To evaluate the benefits of term sanitization in front of a strict redaction, we also 
compared the degree of utility preservation of the output document. As stated in (Martínez et al., 
2013), data semantics is the most important dimension of utility of textual data. Since we 
measure the semantics of terms according to their informativeness, the utility of a document D 
has been quantified as the sum of the information given by all terms appearing in D, as done in 
(D. Sánchez, Batet, et al., 2013a; D. Sánchez et al., 2014). 
( ) ( )
k
k
t D
Utility D IC t
 
 
    
(7)
 
Then, the utility preservation of the redaction/sanitization process was measured as the 
ratio between the utility provided by the redacted/sanitized document D’ with respect to the 
original version D. 
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Notice that the sanitization performed by the human expert will tend to be the strictest 
possible, given her a priori knowledge on the entities to be protected and the fact that she is an 
expert (i.e., highly knowledgeable) in the domain. However, even though this evaluation reflects 
the performance of our proposal in mimicking the human sanitizer actions (which is our main 
goal), it does not explicitly evaluate the practical disclosure of the sanitized output (i.e., the 
probability that external attackers can actually discover the sensitive entities). We leave this 
additional evaluation as future work, which would require highly knowledgeable attackers as 
evaluators and a disclosure risk evaluation criteria (Martínez, Sánchez, & Valls, 2012).   
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Evaluation results regarding the detection accuracy of sensitive terms for the different 
entities, documents and model instantiations with α values between 1.0 and 2.0 are summarized 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 
Precision, recall and F-measure of the detection of sensitive terms for the different entities and 
model instantiations. 
Entity/Wikipedia 
article 
Model instantiation Precision Recall F-measure
HIV  (1.0, HIV)-sanitized 100% 4% 7,7% 
(1.5, HIV)-sanitized 96% 88,9% 92,3% 
(2.0, HIV)-sanitized 81,2% 96,3% 88,1% 
STD (1.0, STD)-sanitized 100% 8,6% 15,8% 
(1.5, STD)-sanitized 87,5% 60% 71,2% 
(2.0, STD)-sanitized 87,5% 80% 83,6% 
Los Angeles (1.0, Los Angeles)-sanitized 100% 5,3% 10% 
(1.5, Los Angeles)-sanitized 76,9% 76,9% 76,9% 
(2.0, Los Angeles)-sanitized 73,3% 84,6% 78,6% 
New York  (1.0, New York)-sanitized 100% 8,7% 16% 
(1.5, New York)-sanitized 71,9% 100% 83,6% 
(2.0, New York)-sanitized 57,1% 100% 72,7% 
Homosexuality (1.0, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
80% 17,4% 28,6% 
(1.5, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
80,1% 77,3% 79,1% 
(2.0, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
81,5% 95,6% 88% 
Catholicism (1.0, Catholicism)-sanitized 100% 8,3% 15,4% 
(1.5, Catholicism)-sanitized 72,7% 72,7% 72,7% 
(2.0, Catholicism)-sanitized 69,2% 81,8% 75% 
 
Figures are quite homogenous for the different entities, although they show significant 
differences between each model instantiation. When α=1, which corresponds to Definition 4, 
detection recall is very low in all cases (around 4-17%), whereas precision is perfect in most 
cases. Several causes explain this behavior. First, as discussed earlier, the web-based probability 
assessment may introduce imperfections in IC/PMI calculi due to language ambiguity. 
Concretely, the availability of different synonyms or lexicalizations of the same concept may 
result in an underestimation of the probability of c, an overestimation of its informativeness and, 
thus, a too loose detection process. Second, by analyzing the criterion of the human redactor, we 
found several cases in which non-unequivocally disclosing terms were tagged as sensitive. This 
shows that, in a practical scenario, disclosing a certain amount (even though not all) of the 
information of c may be considered a privacy threat by human sanitizers. Hence, the initial 
model’s premise could be too rigid in some practical settings. In such cases, a probable enough 
disclosure should be also avoided. Finally, the fact that Algorithm 1 does not consider groups of 
terms to ensure a good scalability results in an omission of apparently innocuous sets of terms 
that, when interpreted in aggregate, may cause disclosure.  
To improve the detection recall, that is, the output’s privacy, without compromising the 
implementation’s efficiency, the α value can be increased to force a stricter assessment of the 
disclosure risk. Results obtained in all tests for α>1 show a significant increase of recall (which 
is above 80% in all cases for α=2) at the cost of a slightly lower precision, that is, utility. Several 
 conclusions can be extracted from this behavior. First, the stricter criterion employed by the 
human expert is better approximated (in terms recall and also of global accuracy, that is, F-
measure) when α>1. For each entity and textual resource, a particular α value would result in an 
optimal balance between precision and recall (i.e., highest F-measure). However, this optimal 
value is application-specific. Second, the lack of analysis of groups of terms can be compensated 
by a stricter evaluation of individual terms (α>1) while retaining the algorithm scalability, which 
solves the problem in linear time with regard to the number of terms in the document. Probability 
calculus inaccuracies, which may result in underestimations of disclosure risks, can also be 
compensated with the stricter detection criteria. Finally, according to F-measure figures, the 
precision decrease caused by the larger number of false positives in comparison with α=1, is 
more than compensated by the very significant increase of recall. 
This shows how even a straightforward implementation of our model (Algorithm 1) can 
be both reasonably accurate and efficient when using the more flexible version of the proposed 
model (Definition 6), and how this flexibility allows implementing a stricter sanitization by 
raising the value of α (at the cost of some precision/data utility) if achieving a high recall is 
critical.  
Results regarding data utility preservation are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Data utility preservation for the different entities and model instantiations when applying term 
redaction (i.e., removal) or sanitization (i.e., generalization) 
Entity/Wikipedia 
article 
Model instantiation Redaction Sanitization 
HIV  (1.0, HIV)-sanitized 96,2% 97,2% 
(1.5, HIV)-sanitized 32,9% 66,6% 
(2.0, HIV)-sanitized 17,6% 61,2% 
STD (1.0, STD)-sanitized 95,3% 97,5% 
(1.5, STD)-sanitized 70,0% 85,8% 
(2.0, STD)-sanitized 65,5% 84,5% 
Los Angeles (1.0, Los Angeles)-sanitized 88,3% 94,6% 
(1.5, Los Angeles)-sanitized 54,4% 80,1% 
(2.0, Los Angeles)-sanitized 48,1% 77,5% 
New York  (1.0, New York)-sanitized 97,2% 99,2% 
(1.5, New York)-sanitized 39,3% 64,2% 
(2.0, New York)-sanitized 20,1% 58,3% 
Homosexuality (1.0, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
92,9% 97,5% 
(1.5, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
55,3% 81,3% 
(2.0, Homosexuality)-
sanitized 
50,4% 77,2% 
Catholicism (1.0, Catholicism)-sanitized 96,3% 98,1% 
(1.5, Catholicism)-sanitized 41,3% 73,4% 
(2.0, Catholicism)-sanitized 30,9% 65,8% 
 
 First, we observe that data utility preservation is a direct function of the detection 
precision reported in Table 1. That is, the lower the precision is, the higher the number of false 
positives and, thus, the larger the amount of terms that are unnecessarily removed or generalized. 
Moreover, the decrease of utility preservation is sharper when redacting terms in comparison 
with a sanitization process. Certainly, term sanitization (i.e., generalization) enables a significant 
increase of data utility in all cases, which is more noticeable as the number of terms detected as 
sensitive increase. This shows that the exploitation of one or several knowledge bases makes the 
output more usable and also less obviously protected; that is, terms to be hidden are generalized 
instead of being blacked out, a measure that may raise awareness of their sensitivity. 
In any case, the degree of preservation also depends on the generality of the concept to 
protect. In order to fulfill the privacy guarantee, the most general ones (e.g., New York, HIV), 
that is, those with a lower baseline IC, would usually require to protect a larger number of 
entities and to generalize them (in case of sanitization) to a higher level of abstraction than the 
most specific ones (e.g., Los Angeles, STD). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Because of the enormous amount of unstructured sensitive documents that are daily 
exchanged, methods and tools aimed to automatize the burdensome sanitization/redaction 
process are needed. This is the purpose of the privacy model proposed in this paper, which 
defines the theoretical framework needed to implement practical sanitization tools that can offer 
clear and a priori privacy guarantees and an inherently semantic privacy protection that aims at 
mimicking the reasoning of human sanitizers. By enforcing the abstract model in terms of 
information theory and quantifying semantics according to the information content of terms, a 
practical and general purpose solution has been proposed. In comparison with other privacy 
models available in the literature, our proposal provides a series of benefits which include i) an 
intuitive and straightforward instantiation according to different privacy needs (i.e., anonymity or 
confidentiality) and scenarios, by using the linguistic labels usually mentioned in current privacy 
legislations, ii) a flexible adaptation of the degree of redaction/sanitization according to specific 
privacy requirements, which can be applied to individual documents, iii) a priori privacy 
guarantees on the kind of data protection applied to the output, iv) an automatic detection of 
terms that may disclose sensitive data via semantic inferences, with an inherent support of all 
kinds of semantic relations (taxonomic and non-taxonomic), and v) support for both redaction 
and sanitization (the latter requires from an appropriate KB). 
As additional contributions of this work, we have i) characterized the semantics of 
disclosure according to the type of semantic relationship between the entities to protect and the 
terms appearing in the document, ii) discussed the relevant aspects that should be considered 
when implementing methods and tools based on our method, iii) proposed a simple and scalable 
implementation algorithm and iv) shown the applicability and suitability of our proposal through 
the evaluation, by a human expert, of the empirical results obtained in several realistic 
sanitization scenarios. 
The proposed model and its information theoretic enforcement open the door for the 
development of theoretically sound redaction/sanitization methods. As future work, we plan to 
develop more accurate implementations of our model which would consider, for example, i) 
improvements on probability assessments by contextualizing web queries and, thus, minimizing 
 semantic ambiguity inherent to raw corpora (D. Sánchez et al., 2010), ii) integration of the 
results provided by several web search engines in order to minimize data sparseness and compile 
more robust probabilities, or iii) semantic disambiguation (Roman, Hulin, Collins, & Powell, 
2012) of sensitive terms in order to retrieve more appropriate generalizations. Moreover, as it has 
been shown through the empirical experiments, different α values are needed to provide an 
optimal balance between data privacy and utility for each specific scenario. We plan to research 
on ways to automate the tuning of this parameter, so that α can be set to an appropriate value 
according, for example, to the informativeness of the entity c and/or of the sensitive terms found 
in the input document. Finally, we also plan to perform additional evaluations that consider also 
the perspective of potential attackers; that is, up to which point an external observer would or 
would not be able to infer the sensitive entities from the sanitized output.  
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